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Abstract
We provide a method for deciding the insecurity of cryptographic protocols in the presence of the
standard Dolev-Yao intruder (with a ﬁnite number of sessions) extended with so-called oracle rules,
i.e., deduction rules that satisfy certain conditions. As an instance of this general framework, we
obtain that protocol insecurity is in NP for an intruder that can exploit the properties of the exclusive
or (XOR) operator. This operator is frequently used in cryptographic protocols but cannot be handled
in most protocol models.An immediate consequence of our proof is that checking whether a message
can be derived by an intruder (using XOR) is in PTIME.We also apply our framework to an intruder
that exploits properties of certain encryption modes such as cipher block chaining (CBC).
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1. Introduction
Cryptographic protocols have been designed for handling secure electronic communica-
tions. Veriﬁcation tools based on formal methods (e.g., model checking) have been quite
successful in discovering new ﬂaws in published security protocols [18,23,29,9,3,4].
While most formal analysis of security protocols abstracts from algebraic properties of
operators, such as themultiplicativity of RSAor the properties induced by chainingmethods
for block ciphers, many real attacks and protocol weaknesses rely on these properties. A
typical example is an attack on Bull’s recursive authentication protocol ﬁrst observed by
Ryan and Schneider [28]. The protocol is used to distribute a connected chain of keys linking
all the nodes from the originator to the server. Ryan and Schneider show that if one key is
compromised the others can be compromised too thanks to the property of the exclusive or
(XOR). Conversely, if XOR is considered a free operator then, as shown by Paulson using
the Isabelle prover [25], the protocol is secure.
Recently, several procedures have been proposed to decide insecurity of cryptographic
protocols w.r.t. a ﬁnite number of protocol sessions [2,5,15,27,22,17]. Moreover, some spe-
cial cases for an unbounded number of sessions have been studied [13,14,11,1] (see also
[20,30] for related work). All these results assume encryption to be perfect (perfect encryp-
tion assumption): one needs a decryption key to extract the plaintext from the ciphertext, and
also, a ciphertext can be generated only with the appropriate key andmessage (no collision).
Only very fewworks on formal analysis have relaxed this assumption. In [21,16], uniﬁcation
algorithms are designed for handling properties of Difﬁe–Hellman cryptographic systems.
In this paper, we generalize the decidability result of [27], stating that insecurity for
ﬁnitely many protocol sessions is in NP, to the case where messages may contain the XOR
operator and where the Dolev–Yao intruder is extended by the ability to compose messages
with the XOR operator. More precisely, we give a linear bound on the size of messages
exchanged in minimal attacks and present an NP procedure for deciding insecurity with
XOR. This extension is non-trivial due to the complex interaction of the XOR properties
and the standard Dolev–Yao intruder rules. The technical problems raised by the equational
laws are somewhat related to those encountered in semantic uniﬁcation.
To prove our result, we have extended the Dolev–Yao intruder with so-called oracle rules,
i.e., deduction rules that satisfy certain conditions. In this general framework we show that
insecurity is decidable in NP. Now, the results for XOR are obtained by proving that the
XOR rules satisfy the conditions on oracle rules.
Our framework is general enough to also handle other algebraic properties. More specif-
ically, we show that the Dolev–Yao intruder equipped with the ability to exploit preﬁx
properties of encryption algorithms based on cipher-block-chaining (CBC) also falls into
our framework.
To the best of our knowledge, the decidability results presented here (see also [6]) are the
ﬁrst, besides the ones by Comon and Shmatikov [12], that go beyond the perfect encryp-
tion assumption. We brieﬂy compare our work with [12]: we prove that, in the presence of
the XOR operator, the problem of checking whether a message can be derived by an in-
truder is in PTIME—this problem is called derivation problem here and ground reachability
problem in [12]. In [12], the derivation problem is shown to be in NP for the XOR oper-
ator and for abelian groups, respectively. As for the general insecurity problem, we show
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NP-completeness based on a theorem that ensures the existence of attacks of linear size.
Comon and Shmatikov present a decision procedure with a higher complexity. This pro-
cedure is based on constraint solving techniques. However, they consider a more general
class of protocol rules. In Section 3.2, we argue that these more general rules are rather
unrealistic. Finally, we believe that our framework is quite general in the sense that different
intruders with different deduction capabilities can be captured such as those for exploiting
properties of encryption based on block ciphers (see Section 7).
Structure of the paper. In the following section, we provide an example illustrating the
role of XOR in attacks. We then, in Section 3, introduce our protocol and intruder model.
In particular, this section contains the deﬁnition of the oracle rules. The decidability result
for the general framework is presented in Section 4, including the description of the NP
decision algorithm. Proofs are provided in Sections 5 and 6. Then, in Section 7, XOR
rules and preﬁx rules are introduced and it is shown that these rules are oracle rules, which
implies the mentioned complexity results. This section also contains an example illustrating
the additional power of preﬁx rules in attacks.
2. A motivating example
We demonstrate that when taking the algebraic properties of XOR into account, new
attacks can occur. As an example, we use a variant of the Needham–Schroeder–Lowe Pro-
tocol [19], i.e., the public-key Needham–Schroeder Protocol with Lowe’s ﬁx, where in
some place, instead of concatenation XOR is used. Using common notation (e.g., {m}pKX
denotes the encryption of message m with the public key of agent X), the protocol is given
as follows:
1. A→ B : {NA,A}pKB
2. B → A : {NB,XOR(NA,B)}pKA
3. A→ B : {NB}pKB .
If XOR is interpreted as free symbol, such as pairing, then according to [19] this protocol
is secure. In particular, the intruder is not able to get hold of NB . However, if the algebraic
properties of XOR are taken into account, the following attack is possible, which is a variant
of the original attack on the Needham–Schroeder Protocol and which allows the intruder
I to obtain NB . In this attack, two sessions run interleaved where the steps of the second
session are marked with ′. In the ﬁrst session, A talks to the intruder I, and in the second
session I, purporting to be A, talks to B.
1. A→ I : {NA,A}pKI ,
1′. I (A)→ B : {XOR(NA,B, I), A}pKB ,
2′. B → I (A) : {NB,XOR(NA,B, I, B)}pKA,
2. I → A : {NB,XOR(NA,B, I, B)}pKA,
3. A→ I : {NB}pKI .
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In step 1′. of this attack, I ﬁrst decrypts the message {NA,A}pKI to obtain NA and A. Then I
applies the XOR operator to compute XOR(NA,B, I), before this message together withA is
encrypted for B. In 2′ and 2 it is used that the messages XOR(NA,B, I, B) and XOR(NA, I)
are equivalent w.r.t. the properties of XOR, i.e., XOR(NA,B, I, B) =XOR XOR(NA, I),
and hence, the message in 2 has the form as expected by A. We emphasize that without
the intruder’s ability to apply the XOR operator and without taking into account algebraic
properties of XOR, this attack could not be carried out.
3. The protocol and intruder model
The protocol and intruder model we describe here extends standard models for the (au-
tomatic) analysis of security protocols [2,14,27,22] in two respects. First, messages can be
built using the XOR operator, which is not allowed in most other protocol models. Second,
in addition to the standard Dolev–Yao rewrite rules, the intruder is equipped with the above
mentioned oracle rules. In what follows, we provide a formal deﬁnition of our model by
deﬁning terms, messages, protocols, the intruder, and attacks.
3.1. Terms and messages
First, recall that a ﬁnitemultiset over a set S is a functionM from S toNwith ﬁnite domain.
We use the common set notation to deﬁne multisets. For example, {a, a, a, b} denotes the
multiset M withM(a) = 3,M(b) = 1, andM(x) = 0 for every x /∈ {a, b}.
Terms are deﬁned according to the following grammar:
term ::= A |V | 〈term, term〉 | {term}sterm | {term}pK |XOR(M),
whereA is a ﬁnite set of constants (atomic messages), containing principal names, nonces,
keys, and the constants 0 and secret; K is a subset of A denoting the set of public and
private keys; V is a ﬁnite set of variables; and M is a non-empty ﬁnite multiset of terms.
We assume that there is a bijection ·−1 on K which maps every public (private) key k to its
corresponding private (public) key k−1. The binary symbol 〈·, ·〉 is called pairing, the binary
symbol {·}s· is called symmetric encryption, the binary symbol {·}p· is public key encryption.
Note that a symmetric key can be any term and that for public key encryption only atomic
keys (namely, public and private keys fromK) can be used. A term with head XOR is called
non-standard and otherwise it is called standard. Because of the algebraic properties of XOR
(see below), it is convenient to deﬁne the XOR operator as done above, instead of deﬁning
it as a binary operator. We abbreviate XOR({t1, . . . , tn}) by XOR(t1, . . . , tn).
Variables are denoted by x, y, terms are denoted by s, t, u, v, and ﬁnite sets of terms are
written E,F, . . ., and decorations thereof, respectively. We abbreviate E ∪ F by E,F , the
union E ∪ {t} by E, t , and E \ {t} by E \ t . The same abbreviations are used for multisets.
For a term t and a set of terms E, V(t) and V(E) denote the set of variables occurring in
t and E, respectively.
A ground term (also called message) is a term without variables. A (ground) substitution
is a mapping from V to the set of (ground) terms. The application of a substitution  to a
term t (a set of terms E) is written t (E), and is deﬁned as usual.
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Given two terms u, v, the replacement of u by v, denoted by [u← v], maps every term t
to the term t[u← v]which is obtained by replacing all occurrences of u in t by v. Note that
the result of such a replacement is uniquely determined. We can compose a substitution 
with a replacement : the substitution  maps every x ∈ V to (x).
Themultiset of factors of a term t, denoted byF(t), is recursively deﬁned: if t = XOR(M),
then F(t) = uniondblt ′∈MF(t ′), and otherwise, if t is standard, F(t) = {t}, where uniondbl is the union
of multisets. Note that F(t) only contains standard terms. For example, with a, b, c ∈ A,
F(XOR(c, 〈XOR(a, b), c〉 , c)) = {c, c, 〈XOR(a, b), c〉}.
The set of subterms of a term t, denoted by S(t), is deﬁned as follows:
• If t ∈ A or t ∈ V , then S(t) = {t}.
• If t = 〈u, v〉, {u}sv , or {u}pv , then S(t) = {t} ∪ S(u) ∪ S(v).
• If t is non-standard, then S(t) = {t} ∪⋃u∈F(t) S(u).
We deﬁne S(E) =⋃t∈E S(t). Note that XOR(a, b) /∈ S(XOR(XOR(a, b), c)).
We deﬁne the size of a term and a set of terms basically as the size of the representation
as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). That is, the (DAG) size |t | (resp. |E|) of a term t (resp.
a set of terms E) is the cardinality of the set S(t) (resp. S(E)). Note that | · | applied to a
set of terms will always denote the DAG size of the set rather than its cardinality.
The XOR operator is considered to be commutative, associative, nilpotent, and 0 is the
unit element.According to these properties, the normal form of a term is deﬁned as the result
of the normalization function _ : term → term. Before providing the formal deﬁnition
of this function, we illustrate it by some examples:
If a, b, c, d ∈ A, then
XOR(XOR(a, b, d), XOR(c, d)) = XOR(a, b, c),
〈XOR(0, a, a, b, c),XOR(a,XOR(a, c))〉 = 〈XOR(b, c), c〉 ,
XOR(a, 〈XOR(b), a〉 , c) = XOR(a, 〈b, a〉 , c).
However,
XOR(〈a, b〉 , 〈a, c〉) = 〈0,XOR(b, c)〉 .
Formally, the normalization function is recursively deﬁned as follows:
• a = a for an atom or a variable a,
• 〈u, v〉 = 〈u, v〉, {u}sv = {u}sv, and {u}pv = {u}pv for terms u and v,• For a non-standard term t, deﬁneMt to be the multiset of factors of t in normalized form,
i.e.,
Mt(t
′) =

 ∑
t ′′,t ′′=t ′
F(t)(t ′′)

 mod 2,
for every term t ′ = 0, andMt(0) = 0. (Recall thatF(t) is a multiset.) Now, ifMt(t ′) = 0
for every t ′, then we set t = 0. IfMt(t ′) = 0 for exactly one t ′, then we deﬁne t = t ′.
Otherwise, we set t = XOR(Mt).
The normalization function extends to sets, multisets of terms, and substitutions in the
obvious way. A term t is normalized if t = t . In the same way normalized sets, multisets
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of terms, and substitutions are deﬁned. Two terms t and t ′ are equivalent (modulo XOR) if
t = t ′. In this case, we write t =XOR t ′.
One easily shows:
Lemma 1. For every n0, term t, and substitution :
(1) |t| |t |, and
(2) t = t = t = t.
We ﬁnally remark:
Remark 2. For every normalized term t with |t |n, the number of arguments of XOR
operators occurring in t is bounded by n. Therefore, representing t (as a DAG) needs space
polynomially bounded in n.
3.2. Protocols
The following deﬁnition of protocol rules, protocols, and execution orderings is explained
below.
Deﬁnition 3. A protocol rule is of the form R ⇒ S where R and S are terms. A protocol P
is a tuple ({Ri ⇒ Si, i ∈ I}, <I , E) where E is a ﬁnite normalized set of messages with
0 ∈ E, the initial intruder knowledge, I is a ﬁnite (index) set, <I is a partial ordering on
I, and Ri ⇒ Si , for every i ∈ I, is a protocol rule such that
(1) the terms Ri and Si are normalized;
(2) for all x ∈ V(Si), there exists jI i such that x ∈ V(Rj );
(3) for every subterm XOR(t1, . . . , tn) of Ri , there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that V(tl) ⊆
∪j<I iV(Rj ) for every l ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{k}. (Note that, sinceRi is normalized, t1, . . . , tn
are standard terms.)
A bijective mapping  : I ′ → {1, . . . , p} is called execution ordering for P if I ′ ⊆ I, p is
the cardinality of I ′ and for all i, j we have that if i <I j and (j) is deﬁned, then (i) is
deﬁned and (i) < (j). Let p be the size of .
Given a protocolP, in the followingwewill assume thatA is the set of constants occurring
in P. We deﬁne S(P ) = E ∪⋃i∈I (Ri ∪ Si)) to be the set of subterms of P, |P | = |S(P )|
to be the (DAG) size of P, and V = V(P ) to be the set of variables occurring in P.
Intuitively, when executing a rule Ri ⇒ Si and on receiving a (normalized) message m
in a protocol run, it is ﬁrst checked whether m and Ri match, i.e., whether there exists a
ground substitution  such that m =XOR Ri. If so, Si is returned as output. We always
assume that themessages exchanged between principals (and the intruder) are normalized—
therefore,m is assumed to be normalized and the output of the above rule is not Si but Si.
This is because principals and the intruder cannot distinguish between equivalent terms,
and therefore, they may only work on normalized terms (representing the corresponding
equivalence class of terms). Finally, we note that since the different protocol rules may
share variables, some of the variables in Ri and Si may be binded already by substitutions
obtained from applications of previous protocol rules. We are not actually interested in a
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normal execution of a protocol but rather in attacks on a protocol. This is the reason why
the deﬁnition of a protocol contains the initial intruder knowledge. Attacks are formally
deﬁned in Section 3.3.
Before we explain Conditions 1–3 in Deﬁnition 3, we formalize the protocol informally
described in Section 2: the set of atoms is
A = {na, a, I, b, ka, kb, ki, ki−1, 0, secret},
where in Section 2 the secret wasNB . The initial intruder knowledge is S0 = {0, I, ki, ki−1,
ka, kb}. The protocol rules are the following, where we have only retained the rules that
are used in the attack:
(a, 1) : 0 ⇒ {〈na, a〉}pki,
(a, 2) : {〈xsecret,XOR(na, I )〉}pka ⇒ {xsecret}pki ,
(b, 1) : {〈xna, a〉}pkb ⇒ {〈secret,XOR(xna, b)〉}pka.
Obviously, Conditions 1–3 are satisﬁed. We have I = {(a, 1), (a, 2), (b, 1)} and <I=
{((a, 1), (a, 2))}.
We now discuss the three conditions of Deﬁnition 3. Condition 1 is not a real restriction
since, due to Lemma 1, the transformation performed by a protocol rule and its normal-
ized variant coincide. Condition 2 guarantees that when with Si an output is produced,
the substitutions of all variables in Si are determined already. Otherwise, the output of a
protocol rule would be arbitrary, which is of course undesirable. For instance, if a protocol
contains a protocol rule of the form a ⇒ x where the variable x occurs for the ﬁrst time,
then x can be substituted by an arbitrary message, and hence, arbitrary output can be pro-
duced by this rule. By Condition 2 such undesirable phenomena are excluded. Condition
3 guarantees that when applying a protocol rule, the substitution of the variables in this
rule can uniquely and immediately be determined when given the input from the intruder
for this rule. For example, if a protocol contains a rule of the form XOR(x, y) ⇒ 〈x, y〉
where the variables x and y occur for the ﬁrst time, then this protocol violates Condition
3: on receiving XOR(a, b, c), for instance, inﬁnitely many substitutions are possible, in-
cluding {x → XOR(a, b), y → c}, {x → XOR(b, 〈a, a〉), y → XOR(a, c, 〈a, a〉)}, {x →
XOR(b, 〈a, 〈a, a〉〉), y → XOR(a, c, 〈a, 〈a, a〉〉)} etc. In other words, a principal can arbi-
trarily pick a substitution out of inﬁnitely many possible substitutions. With Condition 3
we avoid this. The following two examples illustrate that when Condition 3 is not satisﬁed,
then this is due to an “unreasonable” speciﬁcation of the protocol.
We start with a very simple protocol which contains two rules, (A,i) and (A,j), where
(A,i) preceeds (A,j). Intuitively, these rules are part of a description of a principal A who
would ﬁrst apply (A, i) before performing (A, j)
(A, i) : XOR(x, y) ⇒ · · ·
...
(A, j) : x ⇒ y
Informally speaking, in (A, i) principal A accepts a message which A believes to be of the
form XOR(x, y). However, since neither x nor y is known at this point, A has to accept any
message. Only when performing (A, j) one part of the message, namely x, is determined,
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and from this together with XOR(x, y) A can compute the second part, y. The problem with
the above description is that (A, i) cannot be performed deterministically. Principal A has
to guess some x and y (inﬁnitely many substitutions are possible). Only later if (A, j) is
performed x and y can be determined. However, in an attack (A, j)might never be applied.
This phenomenon will occur in every protocol where Condition 3 is not satisﬁed and it is
due to an ill-deﬁned protocol speciﬁcation. In the example, the way the protocol should be
modeled is the following:
(A, i) : z ⇒ · · ·
...
(A, j) : x ⇒ XOR(z, y)
Obviously, in this formulation of the protocol Condition 3 is satisﬁed.
The second example presents a protocol where a message is received at one point of the
protocol run and decrypted at a subsequent step. In the informal Alice and Bob notation,
the protocol is stated as follows:
1. A→ B : XOR({Na}sK , {B}sK),
2. B → A : XOR({Na}sK , {B}sK), B),
3. A→ B : K,
4. B → A : Na.
In this protocol, principal B receives {Na}K⊕{B}K fromA and returns {Na}sK⊕{B}sK⊕B.
When A sends the key K, B is able to retrieve Na from the message previously received
from A. The following is a naïve formalization of this protocol where the partial ordering
of the rules is deﬁned in the obvious way:
(A, 1) : 0 ⇒ XOR({Na}sK , {B}sK),
(B, 1) : XOR({x}y , {B}y) ⇒ XOR({x}y , {B}y , B),
(A, 2) : XOR({Na}sK , {B}sK , B) ⇒ K,
(B, 2) : y ⇒ x.
First note that because of (B, 1), Condition 3 is not satisﬁed. However, this formulation of
the protocol is unrealistic because in (B, 1) principal B only accepts messages which are
obtained as the XOR of two encrypted messages whose key and in case of the ﬁrst encrypted
message whose plaintext B does not know. Hence, in a realistic implementation B is not
able to check whether the received message has the required form, but rather has to accept
any message. The protocol should therefore be stated as follows:
(A, 1) : 0 ⇒ XOR({Na}sK , {B}sK),
(B, 1) : z ⇒ XOR(z, B),
(A, 2) : XOR({Na}sK , {B}sK , B) ⇒ K,
(B, 2) : y ⇒ {z}sNb ,
(B, 3) : XOR({{x}sy , {B}sy}sNb) ⇒ x.
whereNb is a fresh nonce which is only known to B. In steps (B, 2) and (B, 3)we describe
that B receives a message y, supposingly K, which is then used to extract Na from (the
message substituted for) z. Note that this formulation of the protocol satisﬁes Condition 3.
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We point out that in [12] no restrictions on protocol rules are put, and thus, as illustrated
above, also “unreasonable” protocol speciﬁcations, where Condition 3 is not satisﬁed, are
allowed.
3.3. The intruder model and attacks
Our intrudermodel follows theDolev–Yao intruder [13].That is, the intruder has complete
control over the network and he can derive newmessages from his initial knowledge and the
messages received fromhonest principals during protocol runs.To derive a newmessage, the
intruder can compose and decompose, encrypt and decrypt messages, in case he knows the
key.What distinguishes the intruderwe consider here from the standardDolev–Yao intruder,
is that we will equip the intruder with guess rules, which provide him with additional
capabilities of deriving messages. In Section 3.4, we consider classes of guess rules with
certain properties, the so-called oracle rules.As mentioned, in Section 7 we will look at two
different instances of these oracle rules, namely XOR and preﬁx rules.
The intruder derives new messages from a given (ﬁnite) set of message by applying
intruder rules. An intruder rule (or t-rule) L is of the form M → t , where M is a ﬁnite
multiset of messages and t is a message. Given a ﬁnite set E of messages, the rule L can
be applied to E if M is a subset of E, in the sense that if M(t ′) = 0, then t ′ ∈ E for every
message t ′. We deﬁne the step relation →L induced by L as a binary relation on (ﬁnite)
sets of messages. For every ﬁnite set of messages E we have E →L E, t (recall that E, t
stands for E ∪{t}) if L is a t-rule and L can be applied to E. If L denotes a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite)
set of intruder rules, then→L denotes the union
⋃
L∈L →L of the step relations→L with
L ∈ L. With→∗L we denote the reﬂexive and transitive closure of→L.
The set of intruder rules we consider in this paper is depicted in Fig. 1. In this table,
a, b denote (arbitrary) messages, K is an element of K, and E is a ﬁnite set of messages
(considered as multiset).
We emphasize that the notion of intruder rule will always refer to the rules listed in
Fig. 1. For now, there may be any set of guess rules of the kind shown in Fig. 1, later we
will consider certain classes of guess rules, namely oracle rules.
We refer to certain sets of intruder rules using the notation as depicted in Fig. 1. For
example,Lp1(〈a, b〉) refers to the singleton set {〈a, b〉 → a} andLc(〈a, b〉) to the singleton
set {a, b → 〈a, b〉}. In the same way Lp2(〈a, b〉), Lad({a}pK), Lsd({a}sb), Lc({a}pK), and
Lc({a}sb) deﬁne sets consisting of one intruder rule. With Lod(a) and Loc(a) we denote
(ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sets of guess rules. Note that, even if no guess rules are considered, i.e.,
for every message a the sets Lod(a) and Loc(a) are empty, the number of decomposition
and composition rules is always inﬁnite since there are inﬁnitely many messages a, b. The
reasonLp1(〈a, b〉),Lp2(〈a, b〉),Lad({a}pK),Lsd({a}sb),Lc(〈a, b〉),Lc({a}pK), andLc({a}sb)
denote singletons rather than intruder rules is simply notational convenience.
We further group the intruder rules as follows. In the following, t ranges over allmessages.
• Ld(t) = Lp1(t) ∪ Lp2(t) ∪ Lad(t) ∪ Lsd(t) for every message t. In case, for instance,
Lp1(t) is not deﬁned, i.e., the head symbol of t is not a pair, thenLp1(t) = ∅; analogously
for the other rule sets,
• Ld =⋃t Ld(t), Lc =⋃t Lc(t),• Lod =⋃t Lod(t), Loc =⋃t Loc(t),
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Decomposition rules Composition rules
Pair Lp1(〈a, b〉): 〈a, b〉 → a Lc(〈a, b〉): a, b → 〈a, b〉
Lp2(〈a, b〉): 〈a, b〉 → b
Asym. Lad({a}pK ): {a}pK,K−1 → a Lc({a}pK): a,K → {a}pK
Sym. Lsd ({a}sb ): {a}sb, b → a Lc({a}sb ): a, b → {a}sb
Guess Lod(a): E → a Loc(a): E → a with
with a subterm of E E, a normalized and such
and E normalized. that every proper subterm
of a is a subterm of E.
Fig. 1. Intruder rules.
• Lo(t) = Loc(t) ∪ Lod(t), Lo = Loc ∪ Lod ,
• Ld(t) is the set of all decomposition t-rules in Fig. 1, i.e., all t-rule in the left column of
the table,
• Ld =⋃t Ld(t),• Lc(t) is the set of all composition t-rules in Fig. 1.
• Lc =⋃t Lc(t).• L = Ld ∪ Lc.
Note that L denotes the (inﬁnite) set of all intruder rules we consider here. The set of
messages the intruder can derive from a (ﬁnite) set E of messages is
forge(E) =⋃{E′ | E →∗L E′}.
From the deﬁnition of intruder rules in Fig. 1 it immediately follows:
Lemma 4. If E is a normalized set of messages, then forge(E) is normalized.
The lemma says that if an intruder only sees normalized messages, then he only creates
normalizedmessages. Intruders should bemodeled in such away that they cannot distinguish
between equivalent messages since if one thinks of, for instance, the message XOR(a, a, b),
which is equivalent to b, as a bit string obtained by “XORing” the bit strings a, a, and b, then
this bit string is simply b. Therefore, in what follows we always assume that the intruder’s
knowledge consists of a set of normalizedmessages,where every single normalizedmessage
in this set can be seen as a representative of its equivalence class.
We are now prepared to deﬁne attacks. In an attack on a protocolP, the intruder (nondeter-
ministically) chooses some execution order for P and then tries to produce input messages
for the protocol rules. These input messages are derived from the intruder’s initial knowl-
edge and the output messages produced by executing the protocol rules. The aim of the
intruder is to derive the message secret. If different sessions of a protocol running inter-
leaved shall be analysed, then these sessions must be encoded into the protocol P. This is
the standard approach when protocols are analysed w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions,
see, for instance, [27].
Deﬁnition 5. Let P = ({R′j ⇒ S′j | j ∈ I}, <I , S0) be a protocol. Then an attack on
P is a tuple (,) where  is an execution ordering on P and  is a normalized ground
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substitution of the variables occurring in P such that Ri ∈ forge(S0, S1, . . . , Si−1)
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k} where k is the size of , Ri = R′−1(i), and Si = S′−1(i), and such
that secret ∈ forge(S0, S1, . . . , Sk).
Due to Lemma 1, it does not matter whether, in the above deﬁnition,  is normalized or
not. Also note that Lemma 4 implies: forge(S0, S1, . . . , Si−1) = forge(S0, S1, . . . ,
Si−1).
The decision problem we are interested in is the following set of protocols:
INSECURE = {P | there exists an attack onP }.
3.4. Oracle rules
Oracle rules are guess rules which satisfy certain conditions. To deﬁne these rules, we
ﬁrst need some new notions.
A derivation D of length n, n0, is a sequence of steps of the form E →L1 E, t1 →L2
· · · →Ln E, t1, . . . , tn with a ﬁnite set of messages E, messages t1, . . . , tn, intruder rules
Li ∈ L, such that E, t1, . . . , ti−1 →Li E, t1, . . . , ti and ti /∈ E ∪ {t1, . . . , ti−1}, for every
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The rule Li is called the ith rule in D and the step E, t1, . . . , ti−1 →Li
E, t1, . . . , ti is called the ith step in D. We write L ∈ D to say that L ∈ {L1, . . . , Ln}. If S
is a set of intruder rules, then we write S /∈ D to say S ∩ {L1, . . . , Ln} = ∅. The message
tn is called the goal of D.
We also need well-formed derivations which are derivations where every message
generated by an intermediate step either occurs in the goal or in the initial set of
messages.
Deﬁnition 6. Let D = E →L1 . . . →Ln E′ be a derivation with goal t. Then, D is
well-formed if for every L ∈ D and t ′ we have that L ∈ Lc(t ′) implies t ′ ∈ S(E, t), and
L ∈ Ld(t ′) implies t ′ ∈ S(E).
We can now deﬁne oracle rules. Condition 1 in the following deﬁnition will allow us
to bound the length of derivations. Condition 2 says that to derive a from E it is not nec-
essary to ﬁrst compose a message t from E using an oracle rule and then decompose t
to obtain a. Condition 3 allows us to replace a message u which can be composed from
F \ u by a smaller message (u) in an application of an oracle rule. Conditions 2 and 3
together are later used (see Section 6) to bound the size of the substitution  of an at-
tack. They allow us to replace a subterm u in , composed by the intruder, by a smaller
message.
Deﬁnition 7. Let Lo = Loc ∪Lod be a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) set of guess rules, where Loc and
Lod denote disjoint sets of composition and decomposition guess rules, respectively. Then,
Lo is a set of oracle rules (w.r.t. Lc ∪ Ld as deﬁned above) iff:
(1) For every message t, if t ∈ forge(E), then there exists a well-formed derivation from
E with goal t.
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Input: protocol P = ({R ⇒ S,  ∈ I}, <I , S0) with n = |P |, V = V ar(P ).
(1) Guess an execution order  for P. Let k be the size of .
Let Ri = R′−1(i) and Si = S′−1(i) for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
(2) Guess a normalized ground substitution  such that |{(x) | x ∈ V }|3n.
(3) Check that Ri ∈ forge({Sj | j < i} ∪ {S0}) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
(4) Check secret ∈ forge({Sj | j < k + 1} ∪ {S0}).
(5) If each check is successful, then answer “yes”, and otherwise, “no”.
Fig. 2. NP decision procedure for insecurity.
(2) If F →Loc(t) F, t and F, t →Ld(t) F, t, a, then there exists a derivation D from F with
goal a such that Ld(t) /∈ D.
(3) For every non atomic message u, there exists a normalized message (u) with |(u)| <
|u| such that: For every ﬁnite set F of messages with 0 ∈ F , if F \u→Lc(u) F , i.e., u
can be composed from F \ u in one step, then F →Lo(t) F, t implies t[u← (u)] ∈
forge(F [u← (u)]) and (u) ∈ forge(F ) for every message t.
In Section 7 we will present sets of oracle rules. An example for guess rules which do
not form a set of oracle rules is the following: Lod(t) = {{t}sc → t} and Loc({t}s〈a,b〉) ={{t}s〈a,b〉 → {t}sc} where t is an arbitrary message and a, b, c are ﬁxed atomic messages.
That is, Loc({t}s〈a,b〉) allows to turn an encryption with key 〈a, b〉 into an encryption with
key c. Using Lod(t) such a message can then be decrypted. It is easy to check that neither
of the three conditions in Deﬁnition 7 is satisﬁed.
4. Main theorem and the NP decision algorithm
We now state the main theorem of this paper. In Section 7, this theorem will allow us to
show that INSECURE is in NP in the presence of an intruder that uses XOR rules and preﬁx
rules, respectively.
Theorem 8. Let Lo be a set of oracle rules. If E → t ∈? Lo can be checked in polynomial
time in |E, t | for every ﬁnite set E of messages and message t, then INSECURE is in NP.
The NP decision procedure is given in Fig. 2. In the following two sections, we show
that this procedure is sound and complete, and that it runs in non-deterministic polynomial
time. From this, Theorem 8 follows immediately.
Clearly, the procedure is sound. In Section 5 we show that the procedure runs in non-
deterministic polynomial time. To this end, we prove that the derivation problem (called
ground reachability problem in [12]) can be decided in polynomial time (Theorem 9). This
result is of independent interest. As a corollary, we obtain the desired complexity bound
(Corollary 10). Completeness of our procedure is then established in Section 6 where we
show that if there exists an attack (,) on P, then there is one with the size of  bounded
as in step 2 of the procedure (Theorem 20).
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5. Deciding the derivation problem
The derivation problem is deﬁned as follows:
DERIVE = {(E, T ) | t ∈ forge(E)},
where E is a ﬁnite set of messages and t is a message, both given as DAGs.
We show:
Theorem 9. DERIVE ∈ PTIME given that E → t ∈? Lo can be checked in polynomial
time in |E, t | for every ﬁnite set E of messages and message t.
Proof. Let dt (E) be the set consisting of the messages in E and the messages t ′ ∈ S(E, t)
that can be derived from E in one step. Using that the number of terms t ′ ∈ S(E, t) is
linear in |E, t | and that E → t ∈? Lo can be checked in polynomial time it is easy to
see that dt (E) can be computed in polynomial time in |E, t |. Now, if t ∈ forge(E), then
Deﬁnition 7 guarantees that there exists a well-formed derivation D = E →L1 E, t1 →
· · · →Lr E, t1, . . . , tr , with tr = t . In particular, ti ∈ Sub(E, t) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. By
deﬁnition of derivations, all ti are different. It follows r |t, E|.Moreover, with d0t (E) = E
and dl+1t (E) = dt (dlt (E)) we have that t ∈ d |E,t |t (E) iff t ∈ forge(E). Since d |E,t |t (E) can
be computed in polynomial time, Theorem 9 follows. 
As an immediate consequence we obtain:
Corollary 10. The procedure depicted in Fig. 2 runs in polynomial time in |P | given that
E → t ∈? Lo can be checked in polynomial time in |E, t | for every ﬁnite set E of messages
and message t.
Proof. It sufﬁces to observe that steps 3 and 4 of our procedure can be performed in deter-
ministic polynomial time in |P |. Given  with |{(x) | x ∈ V }|3n and using Lemma 1
we have that |Ri, S0, . . . , Si−1| |Ri, S0, . . . , Si−1|  |Ri, S0, . . . , Si−1,(V)|
 |P |+3 · |P | 4 · |P |. Similarly for ∣∣secret, S0, . . . , Sk∣∣. Hence, using Theorem 9 it
follows that steps 3–4 of our procedure can be performed in deterministic polynomial time
in |P |. 
6. Linear bounds on attacks
We now show that the size of an attack can be bounded as required in step 2 of the
algorithm depicted in Fig. 2.
In what follows, we assume that Lo is a set of oracle rules. If t ∈ forge(E), we denote by
Dt(E) a well-formed derivation from E with goal t (chosen arbitrarily among the possible
ones). Note that there always exists such a derivation since the deﬁnition of oracle rules
ensures that a well-formed derivation exists iff a derivation exists.
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Deﬁnition 11. Let P = ({Ri ⇒ Si, i ∈ I}, <I , S0) be a protocol. An attack (,) is
normal if || = x∈V(P )|(x)| is minimal.
Clearly, if there is an attack, there is a normal attack. Note, however, that normal attacks
are not necessarily uniquely determined.
In Lemma 19 we prove, using Lemmas 13–18, that normal attacks can always be con-
structed by linking subterms that are initially occurring in the problem speciﬁcation. This
will allow us to bound the size of attacks as desired (Theorem 20 and Corollary 10).
Let P = ({Rj ⇒ Sj , j ∈ I}, <I , S0) be a protocol such that (,) is an attack on P.
Let k be the size of . We deﬁne Ri = R′−1(i) and Si = S′−1(i) for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Recall
that S(P ) is the set of subterms of P, A ⊆ S(P ), and V = V(S(P )) is the set of variables
occurring in the protocol.
Deﬁnition 12. Let t and t ′ be two terms and  a ground substitution. Then, t is a -match
of t ′, denoted t  t ′, if t and t ′ are standard, t is not a variable, and t = t ′.
The following lemma says that standard subterms s occurring in the substitution  of a
normal attack start with a subterm of the protocol under consideration or (at least) occur
on the left-hand side of a protocol rule when the substitution is applied. Note that even
if s occurs in (x) and x occurs in Ri , s does not need to occur in Ri because of the
normalization.
Lemma 13. If (,) is a normal attack, then for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, x ∈ V(Ri), and
standard subterms s of (x), there exists j i such that s ∈ S(Rj) or there exists
t ∈ S(P ) with t  s.
Proof. Assume that there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, x ∈ V(Ri), and s standard subterm of (x)
such that for all j i: s /∈ S(Rj). Deﬁne
j = min{i′ | y ∈ V(Ri′) and s subterm of (y)}
and let y be a variable of Rj such that s is a subterm of (y). Note that j i, and thus,
s /∈ S(Rj). Let Sy,s be the set of subterms t of Rj such that y ∈ V(t) and s is a
subterm of t. This subset contains y, and thus, is not empty. Let t ∈ Sy,s be maximal
in Sy,s w.r.t. the subterm ordering. We know that t = Rj . Let r ∈ S(Rj ) with t ∈ S(r)
and there exists no r ′ ∈ S(r) with t ∈ S(r ′). Then, since s /∈ S(r), r must be of the
form XOR(t, t1, . . . , tn) with t, t1, . . . , tn standard (since Rj is normalized) and n1 such
that there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, say i = 1, with t = t1 (s has been eliminated by
normalization). In particular, s ∈ S(t1). (This situation is depicted in Fig. 3.)
Let Ms,t1 be the set of subterms t ′ of t1 such that s ∈ S(t ′), and let ts be minimal in
Ms,t1 w.r.t. the subterm ordering. By Deﬁnition 3, (3), and since y ﬁrst appears in Rj , we
have that for all z ∈ V(t1), there exists jz < j with z ∈ V(Rjz). Hence, by minimality
of j, s is not a subterm of {(z)|z ∈ V(t1))}, and thus, ts /∈ V . Moreover, ts is standard
by minimality (otherwise, since s is standard, there would be a factor t ′s of ts such that
s ∈ S(t ′s)). Together, this implies ts = s and ts  s (recall that ts is minimal). 
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Fig. 3. Structure of Rj .
Roughly speaking, the following Lemma 14 states that if a term  can be forged from
a set of messages E by composing with Lc, say composing two messages 1 and 2 both
derived from E, then it is always possible to avoid decomposing  with Ld in a derivation
from E with goal t for some t since such a decomposition would generate a message 1 or
2 that can be derived from E in another way.
First, we need some notation: if D1 = E1 → · · · → F1 and D2 = E2 → · · · → F2 are
two derivations such that E2 ⊆ F1, thenD = D1.D2 is deﬁned as the concatenation of the
steps of D1 and the ones in D2. In addition, to obtain a derivation, we delete in D the steps
from D2 that generate terms already present in F1.
Lemma 14. Let t ∈ forge(E) and  ∈ forge(E) be given with a derivation D from E
ending with an application of a rule in Lc. Then, there is a derivation D′ from E with goal
t satisfying Ld() /∈ D′.
Proof. By deﬁnition of a derivation, Ld() /∈ D. Let D beD without its last rule, i.e.,D
is D followed by some L ∈ Lc. Deﬁne D′′ = D.Dt(E) = D.D′′′ −D′′′ is obtained from
Dt(E) by removing redundant steps. Note thatD′′ is a derivation with goal t.We distinguish
two cases:
Assume L = Lc(). Then Ld() /∈ D′′ since the (two) direct subterms of  are created in
D, and thus, Ld() /∈ D′′. In other words, D′ = D′′ is the derivation we are looking for.
Assume L = Loc(). Then, if Ld() /∈ D′′ setting D′ = D′′ we are done. Otherwise,
let F1 be the ﬁnal set of messages of D. Now, Deﬁnition 7, (2) implies that every step in
D′′′ of the form F1, F2,  →Ld() F1, F2, ,	 can be replaced by a derivation from F1, F2
with goal 	 that does not contain rules from Ld(). Replacing steps in this way and then
removing redundant steps yields the derivation D′ we are looking for. 
The proof of the following lemma is trivial.
Lemma 15. For every normalized ﬁnite set E of messages, message t, and t-rule L, if
E →L E, t then all proper subterms of t are subterms of E.
Proof. ForL ∈ Lod∪Loc use the deﬁnition of decomposition and composition guess rules.
For L ∈ Ld ∪ Lc the statement is obvious. 
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The next lemma states that if a term t ′ is a subterm of a term t and this term is derived
from a set E but t ′ is not a subterm of E, then t ′ can be derived from E and the last step of
the derivation is a composition rule.
Lemma 16. Assume that t ′ ∈ S(t) \ S(E) and t ∈ forge(E), then t ′ ∈ forge(E) and there
exists a (well-formed) derivation from E with goal t ′ ending with a composition rule.
Proof. Let D = E0 →L1 E1 · · · →Ln En be a derivation of t from E0 = E. Then, there
exists a least i = 0 such that t ′ ∈ S(Ei) since t ′ is a subterm of En. Assume that Li is
an s-rule for some s. Then, t ′ is a subterm of s. If t ′ is a proper subterm of s, Lemma 15
implies that t ′ is a subterm of Ei−1 in contradiction to the minimality of i. Thus, t ′ = s
and therefore, t ′ ∈ forge(E). By the deﬁnition of oracle rules, there exists a well-formed
derivationD′ of t ′. If the last step in this derivation is a decomposition rule, then this implies
t ′ ∈ S(E) in contradiction to the assumption. Thus, the last step of D′ is a composition
rule. 
The subsequent lemmawill allowus to replace certain subterms occurring in a substitution
of an attack by smaller terms. Note that from the assumption made in this lemma it follows
that s can be derived from E such that the last rule is a composition rule. This allows to
replace s by a smaller term since when deriving t, decomposing s will not be necessary.
Lemma 17. Let E and F be two sets of normalized messages such that 0 ∈ E ∪ F . Let
t ∈ forge(E, F ) and s ∈ forge(E) non-atomic such that s /∈ S(E). Finally, let  be the re-
placement [s ← (s)],where (s) is deﬁnedas inDeﬁnition7.Then,t ∈ forge(E, F).
Proof. Let Ds = E →L1 E, t1 →L2 · · · →Lp E, t1, . . . , tp →Lc(s) E, t1, . . . , tp, s. By
induction on i and using Lemma 15, it follows that all proper subterms of ti are subterms
of E, t1, . . . , ti−1. Using s /∈ S(E) and s = ti , this implies s /∈ S(ti), and thus, ti = ti
(note that ti is normalized) and ti ∈ forge(E), for every i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Thanks to
Lemma 14, there exists a derivation D = E,F, t1, . . . , tp →Lp+1 E,F, t1, . . . , tp+1 →
· · · →Ln E, F, t1, . . . , tn with tn = t and Li /∈ Ld(s), for every i ∈ {p + 1, . . . , n}. We
know ti ∈ f orge(E), for every i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. We show by induction on i, p in,
that ti ∈ forge(E, F). For i = p this is by Deﬁnition 7, (4). Assume that i > p and
the property is true for all j < i. Then we have three cases:
• If Li = Lc(〈a, b〉), then either ti = s, and thus, using the deﬁnition of (s), ti =
(s) ∈ forge(E, F), or ti =
〈a, b〉 ∈ forge(E, F) since {a, b} ⊆ E ∪
F ∪ {t1, . . . , ti−1}. Analogously for {a}sb and {a}pK .
• If Li = Lp1(〈ti , a〉), then s = 〈ti , a〉 since Li /∈ Ld(s), and therefore, ti ∈
forge(〈ti , a〉 ) ⊆ forge(E, F) since 〈ti , a〉 ∈ E ∪F ∪ {t1, . . . , ti−1}. Analogously
for Lp2, Lsd , and Lad .
• If Li ∈ Loc ∪ Lod , then thanks to Deﬁnition 7, (4), we have: ti ∈ forge(E, F, t1,
. . . , ti−1) and thus: ti ∈ forge(E, F).
For i = n, this gives us t ∈ forge(E, F). 
The next lemma will be used to remove one application of the normalization function.
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Lemma 18. Let  be a normalized ground substitution, E a set of normalized terms, s a
normalized standard non-atomic term, and  the replacement [s ← (s)]. Let ′ = . If
there is no standard subterm t of E such that t  s, then E′ = E.
Proof. Since there is no standard subterm t ′ ofE such that t ′  s, we have (E) = E()
and therefore E′ = (E). Let us prove, by induction on the structure of terms, that
for all t ∈ S(E), we have t′ = t. This will conclude the proof of the lemma.
• If t ∈ A, then t = s by assumption. Thus, t = t = t′.
• If t ∈ V , then t = t, and therefore, t′ = (t) = t.
• If t = 〈v,w〉, we have s = 〈v, w〉 since otherwise t  s, andt′ = 〈v′, w′〉.
By induction, this gives t′ = 〈v, w〉, and therefore, t′ = 〈v, w〉
= t since s = t. The cases t = {u}sv and t = {u}pK are similar.• If t = XOR(T ), where T is a multiset of standard terms, we have:
t′ = XOR({t ′′ | t ′ ∈ T })
= XOR({t ′′ | t ′ ∈ T }) (Deﬁnition of _)
= XOR({t ′ | t ′ ∈ T }) (By induction on every t ′ ∈ T )
= XOR({t ′ | t ′ ∈ T }) (Deﬁnition of _)
= XOR({t ′ | t ′ ∈ T }) (Deﬁnition of  and s standard)
= t (Deﬁnition of _). 
The main lemma, which shows that a substitution of a normal attack can be build up from
subterms of terms occurring in P, is proved next.
Lemma 19. Given a normal attack (,), for all variables x and for all factors vx of (x),
there exists t ∈ S(P ) such that t  vx .
Proof. Assume that (*): for every t, t  vx implies t /∈ S(P ). We will lead this to a
contradiction. Since A ⊆ S(P ), we have vx /∈ A, and since vx is a factor of (x), vx
is standard. By Lemma 13 and (*), there exists j such that vx ∈ S(Rj). Let Nx be
minimal among the possible j. If vx ∈ S(Si) for some i, (*) implies that there exists
y ∈ V(Si) with vx ∈ S((y)). Then, by Deﬁnition 3, (2) there exists Ri′ , i′ i such that
y ∈ V(Ri′). Thus, Lemma 13 and (*) imply that there exists j i with vx ∈ S(Rj).
Note also that vx /∈ S(S0) since otherwise vx ∈ S(P ). Now, the minimality of Nx yields
iNx . Summarizing, we have: vx is not a subterm of E0 = S0, . . . , SNx−1, and vx is
a subterm of RNx. Thus, by Lemma 16, vx ∈ forge(E0).
Let us deﬁne the replacement  = [vx ← (vx)] where ε(vx) is deﬁned as in Deﬁnition
7. Since (,) is an attack, for all j, we have
Rj ∈ forge(S0, . . . , Sj−1).
We distinguish two cases: assume ﬁrst j < Nx . Then, by minimality of Nx , vx is neither a
subtermofRjnor a subtermofS0, . . . , Sj−1.WithRj ∈ forge(S0, . . . , Sj−1)
it follows Rj ∈ forge(S0, . . . , Sj−1). Assume now that jNx .
With t = Rj, s = vx , E = E0, and F = SNx, . . . , Sj−1, Lemma 17 implies
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Rj ∈ forge(S0, . . . Sj−1). Thus, in both cases
Rj ∈ forge(S0, . . . Sj−1).
Now, with E = {S0, . . . , Sj−1} and E = {Rj }, respectively, (*) and Lemma 18 imply for
all j: Rj′ ∈ forge(S0′, . . . , Sj−1′), where ′ = . Hence, (,′) is an attack. But
since ′ is obtained from  by replacing vx by a strictly smaller message, namely (vx), we
obtain |′| < ||, a contradiction to the assumption that (,) is a normal attack. 
We can now use this lemma to bound the size of every (x):
Theorem 20. For every protocol P, if (,) is a normal attack on P, then |{(x) | x ∈ V}|
3 · |P |, where |P | is the size of P as deﬁned in Section 3.2.
Proof. Let F = {s | ∃x ∈ V, s ∈ F((x))} For every s in the set F we introduce a new
variable xs and we deﬁne a substitution ′ such that ′(xs) = s (and other variables are
mapped to themselves). Let V ′ = {xs}s∈F . The cardinality Card(V ′) of V ′ can be bounded
as follows:
Claim. Card(V ′) |P |.
Proof of the claim. We deﬁne a function f : V ′ → S(P ) as follows. Due to Lemma
19, for every y ∈ V ′, there exists ty ∈ S(P ) such that ty /∈ V and ty = ′(y). We
deﬁne f (y) = ty . The function f is injective since ts = ts′ implies ts = ts′. Thus,
Card(V ′) |S(P )| = |P |, which concludes the proof of the claim.
Let S = F ∪ {(x) | x ∈ V}. For all x ∈ V let ′′(x) = XOR(xs1 , . . . , xsm) with
{s1, . . . , sm} = F((x)). Note that, since the s’s are normalized standard messages, (x) =
′(′′(x)).
t′′′ = t for all t.
Hence t′′ is a ′-match of t. However t′′′ is not necessarily normalized which
might be problematic for the sequel. Hence let us build another term t′′
′
from t′′,
such that t′′
′
′ = t. Intuitively, it amounts to eliminate all subterms that “would get
deleted” in t′′ by normalizing t′′′. Let us deﬁne:
XOR(v1, . . . , vn)
′ =
{
XOR(v1, . . . , vn\vi\vj )′ if vi′ = vj′ and i = j
XOR(v
′
1 , . . . , v
′
n ) otherwise.
〈a, b〉′ = 〈a′ , b′ 〉 and similarly for {a}pb and {a}sb.
a
′ = a if a ∈ V ar ∪ V ar ′ ∪ Atoms,
where XOR(v1, . . . , vn\vi\vj ) represents the XOR of all vi for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{i, j}. We
can check that t′′
′
′ = t for all t, since by the above transformation we have
XOR(v1, . . . , vn)
′
′ = XOR(v1, . . . , vn)′. Moreover for all XOR(u1, . . . , uk) subterm
of t′′
′
, we have ui′ standard (since t′′ is normalized and ′(xs) is standard, for all
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s ∈ F ), and it follows 2 that ui′ = 0, and ui′ = uj′ for all i = j , by deﬁnition of
t′′
′
. By consequence t′′
′
′ is normalized and then
t′′
′
′ = t for all terms t.
We are now going to bound |S|. Given a set of normalized messages Z, let
VZ = {x ∈ V |(x) non-standard and (x) /∈ Z},
PZ = {t′′
′ | t ∈ S(P ) and t /∈ Z}.
We note that Z ⊆ Z′ implies VZ′ ⊆ VZ and PZ′ ⊆ PZ , and that VS = ∅.
Claim. |S ∪ PS |  |V∅ ∪ P∅|.
Proof of the claim. We construct a sequence of sets S = Z1 ⊃ Z2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Zn = ∅ with
Zi+1 = Zi \vi where vi ∈ Zi is a maximalmessage inZi (w.r.t. the subterm ordering). Note
that n−1 is the cardinality of S and for every t ∈ Zi+1, vi /∈ F(t). For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
we prove
|Zi ∪ VZi ∪ PZi | |Zi+1 ∪ VZi+1 ∪ PZi+1 |,
which concludes the proof of the claim. At step i, either of two cases may arise when
removing v = vi ∈ Zi from Zi :
• There exists x ∈ V with v = (x) non-standard. Then,
|Zi ∪ VZi ∪ PZi | 
∣∣Zi \ v ∪ {x} ∪ F((x)) ∪ VZi ∪ PZi ∣∣

∣∣Zi+1 ∪ VZi+1 ∪ PZi+1 ∣∣
since x /∈ Zi ∪ VZi , x ∈ VZi+1 , and F((x)) ⊆ Zi \ v = Zi+1.
• v∈F and there exists t ∈S(P ) such that t  v. Let t ′ = t“
′
. We have t ′′ = t =
v. Then,∣∣Zi ∪ VZi ∪ PZi ∣∣  ∣∣Zi+1 ∪ VZi+1 ∪ {t ′} ∪ PZi ∣∣

∣∣Zi+1 ∪ VZi+1 ∪ PZi+1 ∣∣ ,
since ′(y)∈ Zi \ v = Zi+1 for every y ∈ V(t ′) and PZi+1 = PZi ∪ {t ′}.
This proves the claim. Using the claim and
|P∅| =
∣∣S(P )V ′∣∣  ∣∣S(P )V ′∣∣  |S(P )| + ∣∣V ′∣∣ ,
we obtain
|{(x) | x ∈ V}|  |S|  |S ∪ PS |  |V∅ ∪ P∅|
 |V| + |S(P )| + |V ′|3 · |P | 
From this theorem completeness of the procedure depicted in Fig. 2 follows immediately.
2 Remark that ′(x) = 0 for all x.
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7. Extending the Dolev–Yao intruder by different oracle rules
We extend the ability of the standard Dolev–Yao intruder beyond the perfect encryption
hypothesis by considering two speciﬁc sets of oracle rules. The ﬁrst set are the XOR rules
which allow the intruder to make use of the XOR operator. We then consider, what we call,
preﬁx rules which allow the intruder to exploit certain properties of encryption based on
block ciphers.
7.1. XOR rules
The XOR rules allow the intruder to sum several messages with the XOR operator. The
result of this sum is being normalized.
Deﬁnition 21. We deﬁne Lo = Loc ∪ Lod to be the set of XOR rules where
• Loc is the set of rules of the form {t1, . . . , tn} → XOR(t1, . . . , tn)with {t1, . . . , tn} a non-
empty ﬁnite multiset of normalizedmessages such that XOR(t1, . . . , tn) is non-standard,
and
• Lod is the set of rules of the form {t1, . . . , tn} → XOR(t1, . . . , tn) with {t1, . . . , tn} a
non-empty ﬁnite multiset of normalizedmessages such that XOR(t1, . . . , tn) is standard.
We call the intruder using the rules Lo ∪ Lc ∪ Ld the XOR intruder.
Note that the rules in Lod are in fact decomposition guess rules since if XOR(t1, . . . , tn)
is standard, it is a factor of some of the terms t1, . . . , tn. Note that we use that t1, . . . , tn
are normalized. Also, the rules in Loc are composition guess rules since proper subterms
of XOR(t1, . . . , tn) are subterms of factors of this term, and thus, subterms of t1, . . . , tn.
Again, we use that t1, . . . , tn are normalized.
We also note that the intruder is not more powerful if we allow him to derive non-
normalized messages. More precisely, assume that Le is the set of rules of the form
{t1, . . . , tn} → s with s =XOR XOR(t1, . . . , tn) (not necessarily normalized). Let forgee(E)
denote the set of messages the intruder can derive from E with the rules Le, Ld , and Lc.
Then, it easily follows by induction on the length of derivations:
Proposition 22. For every message term t and set of messages E (both not necessarily
normalized), t ∈ forgee(E) implies t ∈ forge(E).
Therefore, we can restrict the intruder to work only on normalized messages and to
produce only normalized messages.
7.1.1. Example
Before showing that the XOR rules are oracle rules, we illustrate that the XOR intruder
can perform the attack informally described in Section 2.
We recall (see Section 3.2) that the protocol underlying the attack is formally described
as follows: the initial intruder knowledge is {0, I, ki, ki−1, ka, kb} = S0. The protocol
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rules are
(a, 1) : 0 ⇒ {〈na, a〉}pki,
(a, 2) : {〈xsecret,XOR(na, I )〉}pka ⇒ {xsecret}pki ,
(b, 1) : {〈xna, a〉}pkb ⇒ {〈secret,XOR(xna, b)〉}pka.
We have I = {(a, 1), (a, 2), (b, 1)} and <I= {((a, 1), (a, 2))}.
When using a perfect encryption model, there is no attack on this instance of the protocol
since the intruder is not able to forge {secret,XOR(na, I )}pka without the oracle rules. On
the other hand, when using these rules, (,) with the execution order  = {(a, 1) →
0, (b, 1) → 1, (a, 2) → 2} and the substitution  with (xna) = XOR(na, b, I ) and
(xsecret) = secret is an attack on this protocol. In fact, it is easy to check that the three
following statements are true:
{〈XOR(na, b, I ), a〉}pkb ∈ forge(0, I, ki, ki−1, ka, kb, {〈na, a〉}pki),{〈secret,XOR(na, I )〉}pka ∈ forge(0, I, ki, ki−1, ka, kb, {〈na, a〉}pki,msg)
with msg = {〈secret,XOR(XOR(na, b, I ), b)〉}pka ,
secret ∈ forge(0, I, ki, ki−1, ka, kb, {〈na, a〉}pki, msg, {secret}pki)
with msg = {〈secret,XOR(XOR(na, b, I ), b)〉}pka .
7.1.2. XOR rules are oracle rules
We now show that the XOR rules form a set of oracle rules. We start to show Deﬁnition
7, (1). To do so, we ﬁrst prove a sufﬁcient condition for a derivation to be well-formed.
Lemma 23. Let D = E0 →L1 . . . En−1 →Ln En be a derivation with goal g such that:
(1) For every j with Ej−1 →Lj Ej−1, t the jth step in D and Lj ∈ Ld(t), there exists
t ′ ∈ Ej−1 such that t is a subterm of t ′ and t ′ ∈ E0 or there exists i with i < j and
Li ∈ Ld(t ′).
(2) For every i < n and t with Li ∈ Lc(t), there exists j with i < j such that Lj is a t ′-rule
and t ∈ S(E0, t ′).
Then, D is a well-formed derivation with goal g.
Proof. From (1) it immediately follows by induction on i ∈ {1, . . . , n} that Li ∈ Ld(t)
implies t ∈ S(E0) for every message t.
Using (2), we prove by induction on n− i that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Li ∈ Lc(t) implies
t ∈ S(E0, g). If n− i = 0, then t = g and therefore t ∈ S(E0, g). For the induction step,
(2) implies that there exists j > i such thatLj is a t ′-rule and t ∈ S(E0, t ′). IfLj ∈ Ld(t ′),
then t ′ ∈ S(E0) (see above). If Lj ∈ Lc(t ′), then by induction t ′ ∈ S(E0, g), and hence,
t ∈ S(E0, g). 
Now, we can prove that XOR rules allow well-formed derivations.
Proposition 24. For every ﬁnite normalized set E of messages and normalized message g,
g ∈ forge(E) implies that there exists a well-formed derivation from E with goal g.
Proof. Let E0 = E and D = E0 →L1 · · · →Ln En be a derivation of goal g of minimal
length. We prove that D satisﬁes (1) and (2) in Lemma 23. We ﬁrst show:
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Claim. If F →Lo(t) F, t →Lo(u) F, t, u, then F →Lo(u) F, u.
Proof of the claim. By deﬁnition of XOR rules, u is a normalized XOR sum of elements in
F, t and t is a normalized XOR sum of elements in F. Thus, u is an XOR sum of elements in
F. Thus, F →Lo(u) F, u. This concludes the proof of the claim. 
By the claim w.l.o.g. we may assume that in D the terms used on the left-hand side of an
XOR rules are not generated by XOR rules. Formally (*): for every i with Li ∈ Lo(t) and
Li = F → t , there does not exist j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Lj ∈ Lo(t ′) for some t ′ ∈ F .
Now, we prove (1) and (2) of Lemma 23:
(1) If Lj ∈ Ld(s)∩Ld(t), then Li /∈ Loc(s), for all i < j , since rules in Loc do not create
standard terms, and Li /∈ Lc(s), for all i < j , by the minimality of D (otherwise Lj
could be removed). Therefore, either s ∈ E or there exists i < j with Li ∈ Ld(s).
If Lj ∈ Lod(t), then t is standard and, by (*) and the deﬁnition of Lod , there exists
a non-standard term t ′ in Ej−1 with t subterm of t ′ and such that Loc(t ′) /∈ D. If
t ′ ∈ E, we are done. Otherwise, there exists j < i such that Lj is a t ′-rule. If Lj ∈
Ld(t ′), again, we are done. Otherwise, Lj ∈ Loc(t ′), a contradiction to the choice
of t ′.
(2) If Li ∈ Lc(t) and i < n, then t is standard, and by minimality of D, there exists j > i
such that t belongs to the left-hand side ofLj . By deﬁnition of a derivation,Lj /∈ Ld(t).
If Lj ∈ Lc(t ′), then t ∈ S(t ′), and if Lj ∈ Lo(t ′), then since t is standard, we have
that t is a factor of t ′, and thus, t ∈ S(t ′), or there exists t ′′ ∈ Ej−1 non-standard with
t ∈ S(t ′′) (t is used to simplify t ′′) such that, by (*), t ′′ was not generated by some rule
in Lo. Since t ′′ is non-standard it cannot be generated by some rule in Lc or Ld . Thus,
t ′′ ∈ E0.
If Li ∈ Loc(t) and i < n, then (*) implies that t = g or there exists j > i such that
Li ∈ Lc(t ′) and t ∈ S(t ′). 
Proposition 25. The set Lo of XOR rules is a set of oracle rules.
Proof. We check each condition in Deﬁnition 7:
(1) The ﬁrst point is a consequence of Proposition 24.
(2) No term created with Loc can be decomposed with Ld .
(3) For F → s ∈ Loc(s), every proper subterm of s is a subterm of F by the deﬁnition of
Loc.
(4) For every non-atomic message u deﬁne (u) = 0. Let u be a non-atomic message, F
be a set of messages with 0 ∈ F and t be a message such that F \ u →Lc(u) F and
F →Lo(t) F, t . Obviously, (u) ∈ forge(F ). Let  = [u← 0]. There are three cases:
(a) Either u = t . Then, t = 0 ∈ forge(F).
(b) Or u = t and u is a pair or an encryption. Then, by the deﬁnition of XOR rules one
easily veriﬁes
F→Lo(t) F, t.
(c) Oru = t and u is non-standard. In particular,F \u→Loc(u) F andu = XOR(t1, . . . ,
tn) with t1, . . . , tn ∈ F \ u. Thus, F \ u →Lo(t) (F \ u), t since if u is needed in
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the construction of t, then the terms t1, . . . , tn can be used. Now, it easily follows
that F→Lo(t) F, t. 
Also, we can show that XOR rules can be applied in polynomial time.
Proposition 26. LetLo be the set of XOR rules. Then, the problemwhetherE → t ∈ Lo(t),
for a given ﬁnite normalized set E of messages and a normalized message t, with set E, t
represented as a DAG G, can be decided in polynomial time with respect to |E, t |.
Proof. Let B be the set of factors of terms in E and S be the factors of t, both can be
represented as subsets of nodes of G. Obviously, B and S can be obtained in polynomial
time, and it can be decided in polynomial time whether S ⊆ B. If SB, then t cannot be
build from E using an XOR rule. Otherwise, S ⊆ B. We can represent t by Factor(t) ⊆ B.
And this set can be represented as a vector of length |B|with entries 0 and 1 where an entry
indicates whether a message in B belongs to Factor(t) or not. This vector can be interpreted
as an element of the vector space of dimension |B| over the ﬁeld with two elements. In the
same way the terms in E can be represented. Now, deciding E →Lo(t) E, t is equivalent to
deciding whether the vector representing t can be represented as a linear combination of the
vectors representing the messages in E. This can be done in polynomial time by gaussian
elimination. 
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 8 we obtain that INSECUREwith XOR rules is
in NP. NP-hardness can be obtained as in [27]. Altogether this yields:
Theorem 27. INSECURE w.r.t. the XOR intruder is an NP-complete problem.
Together with Proposition 26, Theorem 9 implies:
Theorem 28. For the XOR intruder, the problem DERIVE is in PTIME.
In [12], this problem is called ground reachability problem and is only shown to be
in NP.
7.2. Preﬁx rules
As another instance of oracles rules, we consider what we call preﬁx rules. These rules
allow the intruder to exploit certain properties of block encryption algorithms, based for ex-
ample on cipher block chaining (CBC). UsingTheorem 8, again we can show that INSECURE
is NP-complete. Section 7.2.1 provides an example that illustrates the intruder’s additional
power.
Throughout this section, we assume that terms do not contain the XOR operator and that
the normalization function · is the identity function. It is easy to verify that Theorem 8
also holds in this simpliﬁed setting.
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7.2.1. Motivation
As an example, we use a variant of theNeedham–Schroeder symmetric key authentication
protocol [24], which is given as follows:
1. A→ S : A,B,NA,
2. S → A : {NA,B,KAB, {KAB,A}sKBS }sKAS ,
3. A→ B : {KAB,A}sKBS ,
4. B → A : {NB}sKAB ,
5. A→ B : {NB − 1}sKAB ,
6. B → A : {secret}KAB .
This protocol is considered to be secure in [10]. However, a careful analysis of this protocol
reveals a ﬂaw in case encryption is carried out by cipher-block-chaining (CBC) and all
atoms are of the size of a block [26]. The attack in [26] exploits that if a message m is
encrypted using the CBC mode, then it is easy to obtain an encryption of the preﬁx of m
under the same key even without knowledge of the encryption key. In other words, the
intruder can perform the following intruder rule:
{〈M,M ′〉}K → {M}K.
In the example above, the intruder can forge {NA,B}sKAS by applying such a rule on the
second message of the protocol, i.e.,
{〈〈〈NA,B〉,KAB〉, {KAB,A}sKBS 〉}sKAS .
Then, the intruder can send this message to A in another session where B is the initiator of
the protocol. In this second session (denoted by ·′ below), the key NA accepted by A is also
known by the intruder, who can continue the communication with A and derive the secret.
More precisely, the attack looks like this:
1. A→ S : A,B,NA,
2. S → A : {NA,B,KAB, {KAB,A}sKBS }sKAS ,
3′. I (B)→ A : {NA,B}sKAS ,
4′. A→ I (B) : {N ′A}sNA,
5′. I (B)→ A : {N ′A}sNA,
6′. A→ I (B) : {secret}sNA.
7.2.2. Preﬁx rules are oracle rules
Deﬁnition 29. We deﬁne Lo = Loc ∪ Lod to be the set of preﬁx rules where Lod = ∅ and
Loc consists of intruder rules of the form
{〈〈. . . 〈〈M,M1〉 ,M2〉 , . . .〉 ,Mn〉}sK →Loc {M}sK
for any normalized messages K,M,M1, . . . ,Mn, (n1). We call the intruder using the
rule Lo ∪ Lc ∪ Ld preﬁx intruder.
We can prove that these preﬁx rules are oracle rules that can be checked in polynomial time
and then conclude that INSECURE for an intruder equipped with preﬁx rules is NP-complete
by Theorem 8.
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Weﬁrst show that preﬁx rules allowwell-formedderivations and then verify the remaining
oracle conditions.
Proposition 30. For all t ∈ forge(E), there exists a well-formed derivation from E with
goal t.
Proof. Let E0 = E and D = E0 →L1 · · · →Ln En be a derivation of goal g. Let D′ be
a derivation obtained from D with the following transformation system where the rules are
applied with priority order decreasing from 1 to 4.
(1) If i < j withLj ∈ Loc({M}sK) andLi ∈ Lc({〈..〈M,M ′1〉 . . . ,M ′p〉}sK), replaceLj by a
sequence of Ld rules decomposing 〈..〈M,M ′1〉 . . . ,M ′p〉 toM followed by Lc({M}sK).
(Note that the number of Loc rules strictly decreases.)
(2) If i < j with Li = {M ′′}sK → {M ′}sK ∈ Loc and Lj = {M ′}sK → {M}sK ∈ Loc,
then replace Lj by the rule {M ′′}sK → {M}sK . Note that the latter rule belongs to Loc.
The number of Loc rules does not change but the size of the Loc rule argument strictly
increases. (This size is bounded by the biggest term in the derivation.)
(3) If i < j with Li = {M ′}sK → {M}sK ∈ Loc and Lj ∈ Ld({M}sK), replace Lj
by Ld({M ′}sK) followed by a sequence of Ld rules decomposing M ′ to M. (The Loc
rules do not change but the number of rules Ld(t) such that there exists L ∈ D with
L ∈ Loc(t) strictly decreases since, due to (2), there exists no Loc({M ′}sK) rule in D.)
(4) If there exists i < n such that Li is a t-rule but, for all j > i, Lj does not use t, then
remove Li . (This removes rules that produce messages not used in the derivation.)
Clearly, this transformation system terminates: This can easily be shown by deﬁning a
(well-founded) lexicographical ordering with the different components deﬁned according
to the remarks provided along with the transformations. Then, it is easy to observe that
with every application of a transformation rule, the order of a derivation decreases w.r.t. the
lexicographical ordering.
It is also clear that the derivation D′ derived from D by exhaustively applying the trans-
formation rules and eliminating redundant rules is in fact a derivation from E with goal g.
We show that D′ = E′0 →L′1 · · · →L′m E′m is well-formed.
For any rule L′i ∈ Ld(s) in D′, s is neither obtained with Lc (L′i would be useless) nor
withLoc due to transformation rule (3). Therefore, we have s ∈ E or there existsL′j ∈ Ld(s)
with j < i in D′. Iterating this argument, it follows that s is a subterm of E.
For Lc rules, we will reason by induction on m− i, i.e., the induction hypothesis is that
for anymj > i and any message t ′ with L′j ∈ Lc(t ′) the condition on composition rules
in well-formed derivation is satisﬁed. Now, assume that L′i ∈ Lc(t). If m − i = 0, then
t = g, and therefore, t ∈ S(E, g). For the induction step, there exists a rule L′j , j > i, in
D′ using t, by the transformation rule (4). If L′i ∈ Lc(t), it follows from the deﬁnition of
derivations that L′j /∈ Ld(t). If L′i ∈ Loc(t), we also obtain L′j /∈ Ld(t), by transformation
rule (3). Thus, in any case, L′j /∈ Ld(t). Using transformation rules (1) and (2), we can also
conclude that L′j /∈ Loc: While for the case that L′i ∈ Lc(t), this follows immediately by
transformation (1), the case L′i ∈ Loc(t) is covered by transformation (2). Consequently,
L′j ∈ Lc(t ′), and t is a subterm of t ′. By the induction hypothesis and since j > i, we know
that t ′ ∈ S(g, E), and thus, t ∈ S(g, E). 
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We can now prove that these rules are oracle rules:
Proposition 31. The set Lo of preﬁx rules is a set of oracle rules.
Proof. We check each point of the deﬁnition:
(1) If t ∈ forge(E), then there exists a well-formed derivation from E with goal t, thanks
to Proposition 30.
(2) If we have F →Loc({M}sK ) F, {M}sK using {M ′}sK and F, {M}sK →Ld({M}sK )
F, {M}sK,M , then as in transformation rule (3) in the proof of Proposition 30 one
obtains a derivation from F with goal M without a rule in Ld({M}K).
(3) For any relationF →Loc({M}sK ) F, {M}sK the proper subterms of {M}sK are the subterms
of M and K, which are also subterms of F.
(4) Let u be any non-atomic term.We choose (〈a, b〉) = a and (u) = 0 otherwise. Let F
be a set of terms, 0 ∈ F , and {M}sK a term such that F \ {u} →L F, u, withL ∈ Lc(u),
and F →L′ F, {M}sK , with L′ ∈ Loc({M}sK). Let  = [u ← (u)]. We distinguish
four cases:
(a) If u = {M}sK , then {M}sK = 0 ∈ forge(F).
(b) Assume that L′ uses u = {〈..〈M,M ′1〉 . . . ,M ′p〉}sK . If L ∈ Lc(u), it follows that
M,K ∈ F \u, and thus, {M}sK ∈ forge(F). IfL ∈ Loc(u), then {〈..〈M,M ′1〉 . . . ,
M ′q〉}sK ∈ F \ u for some q > p and messages M ′p+1, . . . ,M ′q . Thus, {M}sK ∈
forge(F).
(c) If L′ uses {..〈M,M ′1〉 . . . ,M ′p}sK , 1qp and 〈..〈M,M ′1〉 . . . ,M ′q〉 = u, then{M}sK = {M}K ∈ forge({t}sK) ⊆ forge(F) with t = 〈..〈M,M ′1〉 . . .〉,M ′q−1〉,
M ′q+1〉 . . . ,M ′p〉.
(d) Otherwise, if L′ uses {t}sK , then {M}sK ∈ forge({t}sK). 
Obviously, E → t ∈ Lo can be decided in polynomial time in |E, t |. Also, analogously
to the proof in [27] one can show that INSECUREis NP-hard. Now, by Theorem 8, it follows:
Theorem 32. INSECURE w.r.t. the preﬁx intruder is an NP-complete problem.
With Theorem 9 we obtain:
Theorem 33. For the preﬁx intruder, the problem DERIVE is in PTIME.
8. Conclusion
Based on a general framework in which we equip the intruder with oracle rules, we
have shown that when extending the standard Dolev–Yao intruder by (i) rules for XORing
messages or (ii) rules which allow the intruder tomake use of preﬁx properties of encryption
algorithms the protocol insecurity problem for a ﬁnite number of sessions remains NP-
complete. This is the ﬁrst tight complexity bound given for the insecurity problem without
the perfect encryption assumption. Here we have only considered insecurity as failure
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of secrecy. However, we believe that our result holds also for other properties that can
be reduced to reachability problems in our model, such as authentiﬁcation. Future work
includes applying our approach to other kinds of intruder rules and algebraic laws such as
those for RSA encryption and Difﬁe–Hellman exponentiation. First results have appeared
in [7,8] is an important step in this direction.We have shown that security is decidable for a
large class of protocols based on Difﬁe–Hellman key construction techniques, by reducing
the problem to solving linear diophantine equations.
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